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Introduction
The modern Middle East faces a number of grave political and military
crises that are not only causing tremendous damage to the social order in
the region, but also coming at an increasingly high human cost.1  In partic-
ular, some of the most active conflicts that are responsible for the greatest
loss of life are those raging in Iraq and Syria.2  A number of actors, both
individuals and political/military systems in the area, are directly responsi-
ble for engendering the mass destruction of life and property that have
been rampant for years now.3  Both the Assad regime and the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) are responsible for those
conflicts and continue to perpetrate numerous war crimes and crimes
against humanity under international law.4  Historically, we have seen
occasions where governments and individuals that violated international
law have been brought before international tribunals to face charges for
their crimes.5  The first significant example of this occurred at the
Nuremburg Trials after World War II6 with the prosecutions of a number of
individuals who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity under
the Nazi regime.  Since then, a coalition of countries have established a
number of other international tribunals, varying in nature, for the purpose
of prosecuting violators of international law.7  With such clear and gross
violations of international laws, norms, and customs taking place in Iraq
and Syria today, it makes sense to wonder about the potential establish-
ment of some sort of international tribunal to prosecute those currently
active in the region who are guilty of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.  The question then arises as to what such a tribunal would look
like and how it might operate.
1. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Imple-
mentation of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014), U.N.
Doc. S/2015/962 (Dec. 11, 2015); Civil War in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (updated
Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/
civil-war-in-syria; Zachary Laub, The Islamic State, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 22,
2016), http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811.
2. See generally Civil War in Syria, supra note 1; Laub, supra note 1. R
3. See generally Civil War in Syria, supra note 1; Laub, supra note 1. R
4. Joshua Keating, Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute ISIS for War Crimes, SLATE (Apr. 8,
2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/04/08/isis_and_the_icc_why_
it_s_will_be_tough_to_prosecute_the_islamic_state_for.html.
5. See generally United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, War Crimes Trials,
HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10
005140 (last visited June 24, 2016).
6. See Christopher “Kip” Hale, Does the Evolution of International Criminal Law End
with the ICC? The “Roaming ICC”: A Model International Criminal Court for a State-Cen-
tric World of International Law, 35 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 429, 442 (2007).
7. See id. at 431– 32.
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Because nation-states are responsible for forming international tribu-
nals, we must look at the states that would be involved in such a process in
the Middle East to form an idea as to what a Middle Eastern international
tribunal would look like.8  Indeed, it is possible that Western countries
that are active in the region, such as the United States or certain European
powers, might play a strong role in the implementation of any such interna-
tional tribunal.  It is, however, also possible that Middle Eastern states
themselves could seek to formulate and implement an international tribu-
nal without any sort of overly-dominating interference from the West.
Regardless of whether this happens in the context of the current ongoing
conflicts in the Middle East or not, actors in the Middle East might well
desire to create such a tribunal at some point. Thus, looking at the political
and legal landscapes of these nations might be useful in understanding the
kind of international tribunal that might be formed in the area.
Although the different governmental regimes in the Middle East vary
greatly in their legal and political composition,9 one common and highly
salient demographic aspect that ties them together is that almost every sin-
gle country in the Middle East is a Muslim-majority state.10  Indeed, the
degree that Islam and Islamic law influence these respective governments
is not uniform.11  However, a number of the most powerful and influential
states in the region, including the Islamic Republic of Iran and the King-
dom of Saudi Arabia, utilize Islamic (i.e. Shari’a) law as the basis for their
respective legal codes.12  Because these states are such powers in the
region, it would make sense that one of them might be instrumental in
shaping an upstart international tribunal to prosecute war criminals.  Fur-
ther, those states that play an active role in the formation of such tribunals
often bring their own legal perspectives and systems into consideration in
deciding how to construct those tribunals.13  As a result, the principles of
Islamic law would likely influence or govern such Middle Eastern interna-
tional tribunals.  Furthermore, the influence of Islamic law on the national
legislation and jurisprudence of Muslim states is growing,14 making the
chances that it will have a role to play in any such tribunal all the more
likely.
It is important to emphasize that the goal of this Note is not to make a
value judgment about Islamic law, or to argue that Islamic law should or
should not be the governing law of any war crimes tribunal.  Rather, this
8. See Michael J. Kelly, Islam & International Criminal Law: A Brief
(In)Compatibility Study, 1 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 1, 6 (2010).
9. See id. at 6– 7.
10. See id. at 6.
11. Id. at 8– 10.
12. Id. at 8, 14; M. Raquibuz Zaman, Economic Justice in Islam, Ideals and Reality:
The Cases of Malaysia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, in ISLAMIC IDENTITY AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE 47, 59 (Nimat Hafez Barazangi, M. Raquibuz Zaman & Omar Afzal eds.,
1996).
13. Kelly, supra note 8, at 6.
14. Markus P. Beham, Islamic Law and International Criminal Law, in 7 ISLAM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENGAGING SELF-CENTRISM FROM A PLURALITY OF PERSPECTIVES 349, 349
(Marie-Luisa Frick & Andreas Th. Mu¨ller eds., 2013).
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Note simply seeks to analyze the possibility for such, and to examine the
role that Islamic law might play in the formation of an international tribu-
nal in the Middle East to prosecute regional war criminals.  At the outset,
Section I of this Note will deal with the preliminary matter of examining
the topic of Islamic law generally.  Of course, Islamic law is not a mono-
lithic jurisprudential system; different Islamic legal scholars in different
countries have distinctive interpretations and applications of Islamic law,15
which accordingly might cause differences in the respective establishments
of international tribunals.  Thus, this Note will examine different areas of
Islamic legal scholarship.  Section II will discuss the feasibility of an inter-
national tribunal based on Islamic law, since there is some question as to
whether international tribunals are compatible with Islamic law.  Section
III will look to past international tribunals to determine what the forma-
tion and composition of an international tribunal in the modern Middle
East might look like.  Section IV will look at the International Criminal
Court, examining its potential for conducting a tribunal in the Middle East
in light of the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria.  Further, Section IV will
examine the various actors who might be responsible for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, and assess their culpability under an interna-
tional tribunal governed by Islamic law.  Finally, Section V will address the
issue of what an actual Islamic war crimes tribunal would look like.  Ulti-
mately, this Note will conclude with the determination that a Western-style
international war crime tribunal in the Middle East to prosecute the crimes
of the Assad regime and ISIL would be difficult to establish, though not
impossible.  Given the difficulties posed to the formation of any such tribu-
nal, either a hybrid-international tribunal or the International Criminal
Court would be the type of forum most likely to be effective, and that
Islamic law could serve, at least in some capacity, as the substantive law of
such a tribunal.  Furthermore, this Note will also argue that although an
Islamic war crimes tribunal might be capable of adopting different Islamic
legal systems as its choice of law, international involvement should con-
tinue to ensure upholding international legal standards and effectively
utilizing Islamic law to try violators of international criminal law.
I. An Overview of Islamic Law
A. Key Terms and Concepts of Islamic Law
To understand the interaction between Islamic law and international
human rights or criminal law, we must understand what Islamic law is, its
sources, and how it functions.  There are five primary sources of Islamic
law.16  The first is the holy book of Islam, the Qur’an, which Muslims con-
sider to be infallible under Islamic law.17  The second is the Sunnah, which
encompasses the “traditional interpretive guides to the Qur’an functioning
15. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 14.
16. See id. at 10.
17. Id.
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as a living example of Muhammad.”18  The third is the Fiqh, the “body of
Islamic jurisprudence including the rulings of judges and Islamic scholars
that direct and apply Shari’a to individual Muslims in their daily lives.”19
The Fiqh also encapsulates the fourth and fifth sources of Islamic law: the
Qiyas and the Ijma.20  The Qiyas are the analogical reasoning of Islamic
jurists,21 while the Ijma is juristic consensus.22  Some scholars argue, how-
ever, that the Fiqh “inappropriately blends revealed and unrevealed truth,”
and consequently that “the Qur’an and Sunnah should be kept separate as
a Basic Law from the Fiqh, which is a constantly evolving body of law.”23
In other words, the Qur’an and Sunnah comprise divinely revealed Shari’a,
while the Fiqh embodies the human interpretation of Shari’a, and the two
bodies together form the whole of Islamic law.24
Furthermore, this is not where the complexities end when it comes to
the Fiqh.  As a body of jurisprudence that continues evolving with the work
of scholars, the Fiqh is not subject to rigid codification.25  Although this
might seem to parallel common law, the Fiqh is much less readily ascer-
tainable than common law because the Fiqh splits into a number of differ-
ent schools of thought that are largely divided across geographic and
sectarian lines across the Muslim world.26  Furthermore, the Fiqh has
received criticism for being insufficient to meet the needs of modern Mus-
lim communities, with some commentators pointing to its adherence to
strict and socially harmful fundamentalism.27
Within Islamic law, there are three general classes of crimes: the
hudud, qisas, and ta’zir.28  The hudud are crimes against God.29  Accord-
ing to the Qur’an, the hudud encompasses actions such as sexual inter-
course outside of wedlock, alcoholism, and apostasy.30  Traditionally,
hudud crimes have incurred very heavy penalties, though this has changed
somewhat in modern times.31  The qisas are crimes against individuals
and include such acts as homicide and “crimes against mankind.”32
Finally, the ta’zir are crimes against the interest of the public, which
include corruption, bribery, and certain kinds of falsifications.33
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 37 (Ian
Brownlie & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2003).
23. Kelly, supra note 8, at 11.
24. BADERIN, supra note 22, at 34.
25. Kelly, supra note 8, at 11.
26. Id.
27. Ali Khan, The Reopening of the Islamic Code: The Second Era of Ijtihad, 1 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 341, 341 (2003– 04).
28. FARHAD MALEKIAN, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COM-
PARATIVE SEARCH 344– 46 (Eugene Cotran, Mark Hoyle & Martin Lau eds., 2d ed. 2011).
29. Id. at 344.
30. Id. at 345.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 346.
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B. Varying Application of Islamic Law Among Muslim-Majority States
Across the spectrum of Muslim-majority countries, the implementa-
tion of Islamic law varies greatly, particularly within the sphere of criminal
law.34  Some countries, such as Pakistan, operate under an essentially
Westernized legal system, using Shari’a only in select circumstances.35
However, in other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Shari’a serves as the
sole basis of their legal systems, with the Qur’an and Sunnah serving as the
national constitution.36  Similarly, other Gulf states and Iran have classical
Shari’a systems with Islamic law forming the basis of national law.37  Fur-
thermore, not all nation-states uniformly implement Shari’a; in Nigeria, for
example, different states have different criminal law systems, with some
implementing Shari’a while others do not.38  However, not every Muslim-
majority country integrates Shari’a into its legal system; Turkey is one such
country, having abolished Shari’a law with Atatu¨rk’s reforms in 1924.39
Before proceeding further, it may be helpful to clarify what precisely is
meant by “Muslim/Islamic state.”  It is not only official Islamic Republics
that are in fact Islamic; many states, though not officially Islamic Repub-
lics, have governments and societies with ideologies that are deeply rooted
in Islamic values and law.40  Thus, from here forward, this note will define
Muslim/Islamic/Muslim-majority states as those states who hold member-
ship in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the mission of
which is the “promotion of Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and economic
values among the member states.”41  This note will also include Syria in
the category of “Muslim/Islamic state,” despite its current suspension from
the OIC.42
II. The Interaction and Compatibility of Islamic and International
Law
A. Islam and the West: Was Huntington Right?
Any analysis of criminal law on the global level requires an examina-
tion of international human rights law.  International human rights law
34. Kelly, supra note 8, at 14.
35. Id.
36. Zaman, supra note 12, at 59.
37. JAN MICHIEL OTTO, SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES TENSIONS AND
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DUTCH AND EU FOREIGN POLICY 8– 9 (2008).
38. See HAUWA IBRAHIM & PRINCETON N. LYMAN, REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW SHARI’A
LAW IN NIGERIA, AFRICA POLICY STUDIES PROGRAM AT THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
at ii (2004).
39. See IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS, INSTILLING RELIGION IN GREEK AND TURKISH NATIONAL-
ISM: A “SACRED SYNTHESIS” 63 (2013); OTTO, supra note 37, at 9.
40. BADERIN, supra note 22, at 8.
41. Id.; see Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Preamble, Mar.
14, 2008, 914 U.N.T.S. 111.
42. Al Arabiya with Agencies, Organization of Islamic Cooperation suspends Syria’s
membership, AL ARABIYA NEWS CHANNEL (Aug. 13, 2012), http://english.alarabiya.net/
articles/2012/08/13/232088.html.
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has largely been a product of Western nations.43  Within the West, many
have often been skeptical that Islamic law adequately deals with human
rights, particularly given the political and human rights problems, as well
as particular methods of criminal punishment, that have pervaded certain
Islamic legal systems globally.44  Samuel P. Huntington’s seminal article
The Clash of Civilizations? comes to mind,  wherein the political scientist
outlined his theory that in the twenty-first century, “the dominating source
of conflict will be cultural.”45  Huntington argues that Western concepts
“differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations,” and that
certain Western values and features such as individualism, liberalism, con-
stitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy,
free markets, and the separation of church and state, “often have little
resonance” in societies outside the West.46  Huntington declares that relig-
ion, Islam specifically, is the controlling force of culture in Muslim-major-
ity countries.47  He posits an “Islamic civilization” that lies in opposition to
the West, noting that struggles “between Western and Islamic civilizations”
have gone on roughly since the inception of Islam itself.48
Some scholars counter that such views are obsolete, and that there is
no reason why a modern interpretation and application of Islamic law is
incompatible with international human rights law.49  Some go even fur-
ther, implying that, if anything, international human rights law follows in
the footsteps of Islamic law; since many of the principles of public interna-
tional law articulated in the post-World War II era had already been enu-
merated within Islamic law fourteen-hundred years prior, and that human
rights law within Islamic law is actually juridically stronger than some
Western standards of human rights law.50
B. Differences in International and Islamic Law on Issues of
Compatibility
However, what is incontrovertible is that there are non-trivial differ-
ences between Islamic law and international human rights law.51  A clear
example of this is the classification of hudud crimes in Islamic law.52
International human rights law recognizes nothing that would parallel this
category of offenses, and offers no justification for why actions that would
qualify as hudud crimes should merit punishment.53  Indeed, even schol-
ars who view international human rights law and Islamic law as reconcila-
ble acknowledge that tensions arise within these two realms over the
43. BADERIN, supra note 22, at 10.
44. Id. at 10– 11.
45. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22 (1993).
46. Id. at 40.
47. See id. at 29– 35.
48. Id. at 31.
49. See MALEKIAN, supra note 28, at 114.
50. Id.
51. See BADERIN, supra note 22, at 6.
52. Id. at 79.
53. Id. at 80.
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rendering of judgments and punishments for the commission of hudud
offenses.54  Scholars such as Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, however, have
argued for the application of a concept called “neo-ijtihad,” which claims
that “Shari’ah is merely a level of Islam best suited to the needs . . . of a
previous stage of human development,”55 and that “new principles should
be developed in order to address the needs and expectations of this day
and age.”56  Such submissions for reform would call for a cessation to the
punishment of hudud crimes under Shari’a law, but other scholars have
not accepted these appeals, with some arguing against what An-Na’im
proposes.57
Given the inconsistencies between international human rights law and
Islamic law, one might wonder whether these inconsistencies inhibit cer-
tain interactions between the two systems.  Indeed, there is a question as to
whether such inconsistencies might pose an issue for the utilization of
Islamic law within war crimes tribunals.  Some research suggests that sig-
nificant aspects of criminal law within Shari’a, those which create a note-
worthy distinction between Western law and Islamic law, make it less
likely that states that incorporate Shari’a into their criminal law systems to
a great degree will participate in international criminal law procedures.58
C. Acceptance of International Law in Muslim Societies
Aside from systemic incompatibilities, evidence also shows that many
individuals within Muslim communities may reject the implementation of
international legal norms as the proper basis for imposing criminal liabil-
ity under any circumstances.59  Although there is no consensus that
Islamic law totally precludes the application of international human rights
law,60 there have been trends within the Islamic legal world to promote
Islamic human rights law as the proper system to adjudicate such issues,
with some Muslims protesting any calls by the West to have international
human rights applied universally.61  It is important to note, however, that
political happenings have engendered many of these trends.62  For exam-
ple, certain Islamic rights enumerated in the Cairo Declaration, a docu-
54. Id.
55. Matthew Lippman, Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: Religious Fundamental-
ism v. Modern Law, 12 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 56 (1989).
56. Id.
57. See Matthias Cernusca, Islamic Criminal Procedure and the Principle of Comple-
mentarity of the International Criminal Court, in 7 ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENGAG-
ING SELF-CENTRISM FROM A PLURALITY OF PERSPECTIVES 367, 370– 71 (Marie-Luisa Frick &
Andreas Th. Mu¨ller eds., 2013).
58. Kelly, supra note 8, at 11.
59. See The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society: Chapter 1: Beliefs About
Sharia, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/
the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-sharia/.
60. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures
or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 307, 309 (1994).
61. The Cario Declaration was a direct response to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and it contained a great degree of Shari’a law. Id. at 401.
62. See Kelly, supra note 8, at 18.
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ment drafted as a direct response to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and which contains a great degree of Shari’a law,63 were created by
local leaders as a means of engendering political support for themselves.
As such, there are more factors at work than just Islam that have led to
these anti-internationalist trends.64
Regardless, the motivation for such trends is largely irrelevant.  What
really matters is the existence of such trends.  If such trends dominate dis-
cussions within the Islamic legal community, it would seem to make it
more likely that Islamic societies would reject international human rights
law as the correct system for adjudicating matters of criminal law.  How-
ever, the motivation for promoting these trends does become relevant in
regards to the matter of whether they are either fixed or transient.  It is
possible that politics could change and force a transformation in these
trends themselves, whereas such trends would almost certainly be much
more likely to be permanent and immutable if the views embodied in these
trends were endemic to Islamic culture.  Thus, because such trends appear
to be politically motivated, there is no guarantee that they will persist indef-
initely, since politics are always subject to change.  It is therefore possible
that such trends could reverse, leaving open the possibility that the Islamic
legal world could become more receptive to the application of international
criminal law.
D. Factors That Both Challenge and Facilitate the Compatibility of
International and Islamic Law
Apart from politically motivated calls by some to reject the implemen-
tation of international human rights law in Islamic societies, there are
other factors in Islamic law that cause some to believe in the incompatibil-
ity of Shari’a and international criminal law.65  Professor Michael Kelly
lists a number of such factors, including the multitude of Shari’a schools of
thought across the Muslim world, the difficulty in designing international
tribunals to accommodate Muslim traditions, and the effect of tribalism in
engendering disdain for foreign interference in local law.66  Nonetheless,
Kelly also states that “the internationalization of criminal law . . . has
gained traction since the end of the Cold War.”67  On top of this, Kelly
further notes that certain Muslim societies will be unable to avoid dealing
with current issues in a comprehensive way, given the sheer degree of their
effect and importance in the field of human rights law.68  In sum, although
factors do exist in the realm of Islamic law that might interfere with the
application of international criminal law in Islamic jurisdictions, the com-
bination of a number of relevant factors— the possibility of political
changes reversing the trend of denouncing international human rights law
63. Id.
64. See Mayer, supra note 60, at 401– 02.
65. Kelly, supra note 8, at 23.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19.
68. See id. at 21.
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imposition in Muslim societies, the ever-increasing globalization of interna-
tional law, and the sheer need for Muslim societies to address human
rights concerns in an effective way— at least potentially makes the applica-
tion of international criminal law in Muslim societies possible.  Further-
more, although there is some degree of collision between Islamic law and
international human rights, the fact that there appears to be a “general
acceptance of a number of core crimes, which are also held to constitute jus
cogens, show[ing] that there is a sense of ‘overlapping-consensus’ . . .
regarding some fundamental human rights” supports the aforementioned
proposition.69  Consequently, this leaves open the possibility of war crimes
tribunals functioning in nations operating under Shari’a legal systems.
Nonetheless, although the confluence of Islamic and international law
in the form of a war crimes tribunal may be possible, a number of chal-
lenges still remain.  Even progressive or “reformist” scholars such as Abdul-
lahi Ahmed An-Na’im have conceded that that the large-scale trend in the
Muslim world has not been favorable towards human rights.70  Further-
more, from an institutional perspective, the participation of Muslims in the
international legal community has not been as high as might otherwise be
helpful in Islamic/international legal integration.71  Relatively few judges
from Muslim nations have formed the bodies of international tribunals,72
and of the eighteen judges of the International Criminal Court, only one is
from a dominantly-Muslim country (Nigeria).73  Thus, to realize the possi-
bility of a war crimes tribunal organized under Islamic law, the architects
of such a tribunal will need take into account all of these challenges, and
construct the tribunal in such a way as to enable it to deal with them
effectively.
III. War Crimes Trials by Type and Application
A. Brief History on War Crimes Tribunals and Their Different Forms
Given the tensions and difficulties that would arise in establishing a
war crimes tribunal in nations that use Islamic law as the basis for their
criminal law system, it would be helpful to analyze different types of war
crimes tribunals that have been created in the past to see how best to create
such a tribunal in Islamic societies today.  War crimes tribunals primarily
prosecute three specific crimes: crimes against humanity, genocide, and
war crimes.74  A fourth crime tried at Nuremburg and Tokyo, the crime of
aggression, has never been tried since and remains essentially an inchoate
crime.75  The oldest model of such tribunals is the ad hoc tribunal, exam-
69. Beham, supra note 14, at 364.
70. Id. at 361.
71. Id. at 363.
72. Id. at 361.
73. Current Judges - Biographical Notes, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20
judges/Pages/judges.aspx (last visited June 24, 2016).
74. Kelly, supra note 8, at 20.
75. Id.
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ples of which can be seen in the cases of Yugoslavia and Rwanda.76  These
two tribunals were designed to function only temporarily, and around nar-
row subject-matter and territorial jurisdiction.77  However, one feature that
many observers have seen as a weakness of the ad hoc model is the lack of
investment or interest the tribunals tend to have in the local communities
where the trials take place.78  Also, fashioning such tribunals from whole
cloth has been shown to, at times, come at a prohibitively high cost.79
Since the inception of war crimes tribunals, other models besides the
ad hoc form have developed.80  One such model is the hybrid tribunal
(also known as the mixed or internationalized tribunal).81  Such tribunals
tend to use a fusion of both domestic and international law.82  Examples of
countries that have implemented such hybrid models are Sierra Leone and
Cambodia,83 though in the latter case political issues encumbered the effi-
cacy of the tribunal.84
Aside from the ad hoc and hybrid models, both of which were created
to serve as temporary bodies, there now also exists a permanent body
capable of hearing cases of international criminal law: the International
Criminal Court (ICC).85  The ICC serves as a forum to prosecute “the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community”86 when local
courts are either incapable or unwilling to do so themselves.87  Specifi-
cally, the court has jurisdiction over the same four categories of interna-
tional crimes listed above that war crimes tribunals typically prosecute.88
It also acts as a deterrent against would-be human rights violators, to pre-
vent them from acting with total impunity under the presumption that they
would face no punishment for their crimes.89
76. Id. at 19; see SARAH WILLIAMS, HYBRID AND INTERNATIONALISED CRIMINAL TRIBU-
NALS: SELECTED JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 3 (Mohammed Ayat et al. eds., 2012).
77. Kelly, supra note 8, at 19.
78. Id.
79. James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribu-
nals, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616, 616 (2005).
80. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 4.
81. Id. at 4– 5.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Kelly, supra note 8, at 19– 20.
84. See generally Susan Postlewaite, The Pre-Trial Hearing of Pol Pot’s Key Woman
Commander is the Latest Attempt to Bring the Khmer Rouge’s Ageing Leaders to Justice, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, May 29, 2008.
85. Ashley Joy Stein, Reforming the Sentencing Regime for the Most Serious Crimes of
Concern: The International Criminal Court Through the Lens of the Lubanga Trial, 39
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 521, 523– 24 (2014).
86. Id. at 521.
87. Kelly, supra note 8, at 20.
88. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5– 8, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3.
89. See Cheryl K. Moralez, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Will it
Work?, 4 DEPAUL INT’L L.J. 135, 136 (2000).
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B. The Wilaˆyah al-Mazaˆlim: A Court for all the Muslim World
In terms of the specific forms of war crimes tribunals that could actu-
ally materialize in the Muslim societies of the Middle East, there are a num-
ber of possibilities.  One novel proposal offered by Professor Mashood
Baderin is the establishment of a “regional enforcement organ” similar to a
tribunal known as the Wilaˆyah al-Mazaˆlim, which existed in the days of the
Islamic Empire and heard complaints and grievances “with inter-provincial
jurisdiction throughout the Islamic Empire to redress any alleged violation
of individual rights by State officials.”90  On top of the establishment of
such a court, Baderin stresses the importance of a fully binding Islamic
Human Rights Covenant, which he lists as an essential factor in making
such a court truly efficacious, given that the Cairo Declaration is both non-
binding from a legal perspective and also lacking in many indispensable
rights.91  Baderin goes on to further lay out his vision as to what such a
tribunal would look like:
The proposed regional enforcement organ can . . . [have] jurisdiction to adju-
dicate on allegations of human rights violations against any of the OIC
Member States, and also to interpret the scope of the rights guaranteed
under the present OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, and
any subsequent binding Covenant, and also rights guaranteed under the
Sharˆı’ah in general.  The Court would be composed of highly qualified
Islamic law jurists not only learned in Islamic jurisprudence, but also con-
versant with international human rights law and jurisprudence.  That would
provide a definite and unified Islamic parameter for determining the scope
of human rights within the application of Islamic law by Muslim States.92
Baderin further states that the proposed Mazaˆlim court should be able to
accommodate different schools of Islamic legal thought and should have
“compulsory jurisdiction for individual complaints against human rights
violations in the OIC Member states,” so as to holistically promote human
rights in the Muslim world.93  However, Kelly notes that while the idea of
such a court may seem attractive, the sheer level of divergence among OIC
states compared to the unity that existed under the Islamic Empire renders
the practicability of establishing a Mazaˆlim court today nearly
nonexistent.94
C. Hybrid Tribunals: The Examples of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
and the Iraqi High Tribunal
Given the concerns over incompatibilities between Islamic law and
international criminal law, some have proposed the creation of “a hybrid
international/Islamic criminal court.”95  Such a court would function like
other hybrid war crimes tribunals by combining elements of both domestic
90. BADERIN, supra note 22, at 229.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 230.
93. Id.
94. Kelly, supra note 8, at 24.
95. Id. at 23.
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(in this case, Islamic) and international law.  Hybrid models such as this
have been established in the Middle East in the past.  The Special Tribunal
for Lebanon (STL) commenced operations in 2009 with the goal of prose-
cuting those who planned and ordered the 2005 assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.96  Early on, the idea of the STL
operating as a wholly internationalist body was rejected in favor of a
“mixed” tribunal incorporating the law of Lebanon, so as not to “remove
Lebanese responsibility for seeing justice done regarding a crime that pri-
marily and significantly affected Lebanon.”97  In 2008, Lebanese authori-
ties detained four suspects and handed them over to STL custody, with the
first formal indictment coming down in 2011.98  The STL’s first trial, Pros-
ecutor v. Ayyash et al., commenced on January 16, 2014.99
Another example of a hybrid tribunal is the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT)
against Saddam Hussein.100  Hussein assumed power of Iraq in 1979 and
engaged in activities that violated international laws and norms.101  He
initiated a purge against those within his political party, ordered tortures,
and targeted minority groups disloyal to his government.102  Hussein also
ordered the gassing of between 4,000 and 5,000 Kurds in Halabja as part of
the Anfal campaign.103  Estimates suggest that the Iraqi government
orchestrated the killing of over 500,000 civilians between 1968 and
2003.104  The regime was characterized by “widespread and systematic dis-
appearances, extrajudicial executions, torture, arbitrary arrests, and deten-
tions.”105  After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Hussein’s
subsequent capture, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), a tempo-
rary government established by the United States and the United Kingdom
to fill the vacuum until a permanent government could take control of the
country, began deliberating as to what type of forum should be imple-
mented to prosecute the war crimes that the Hussein regime had been
responsible for.106  The United States did not support the formation of a
dominantly internationalist tribunal, both because of the fear that such a
tribunal would be enormously costly and time-consuming and concerns
that the United States harbored regarding the ICC.107  Moreover, the Iraqi
authorities’ desire to retain the death penalty posed a great barrier for a
96. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 73– 78.
97. Id. at 75.
98. Id. at 78– 79.
99. About the Ayyash et al. trial, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, http://www.stl-tsl
.org/en/the-cases/about-the-trial (last visited June 24, 2016).
100. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 109– 20.
101. Id. at 109– 10.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 110.
104. Id.
105. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special
Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 327, 331 (2005).
106. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 114.
107. Id. at 110– 14.
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chiefly international model.108  Thus, the model that eventually was propa-
gated, the IHT, was a dominantly Iraqi national tribunal.109
However, the IHT still operated within certain internationalist dimen-
sions, thus rendering the tribunal a hybrid model.  The IHT was required
to meet international standards of justice, to appoint non-Iraqis as advis-
ers, and to “ ‘resort to the relevant decisions of international courts” or
tribunals as persuasive authority for their decisions in relation to the inter-
pretation of the international crimes within the Court’s material jurisdic-
tion.110  Ultimately, the IHT handed down the decision that resulted in the
execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006.111  However, Hussein’s
trial has been cited as highly controversial, with some critics going so far as
to declare it “such a failure that the case would not be cited as authority by
any subsequent international judicial body.”112
While these hybrid tribunals might seem attractive in certain ways,
Kelly contends that similar differences in the application of Islamic law
across nations and jurisdictions that doomed the Mazaˆlim court also make
a hybrid tribunal difficult to implement.113  While the formation of such a
tribunal is not entirely impossible, Kelly argues that its formation will
require growing cohesion between Western and Islamic legal systems,
which, although possible and desirable by some, does not seem realizable
in the near-term.114  Therefore, the IHT seems particularly intriguing.  If
the synergy of international law and Islamic legal systems is as difficult as
Kelly says, then the IHT-model seems to be a potentially viable alternative
given its dominantly national disposition with international rules playing
mostly a supervisory role.  The model also seems to be an effective way to
navigate issues regarding cost and international cooperation that might
still exist today, given that the IHT was able to operate under the con-
straints of these same pressures previously.115  However, given the contro-
versy that surrounded the outcome of the trial of Saddam Hussein, there
would certainly need to be examinations as to what failed in that case so as
to avoid the repetition of such mistakes in the future.  On the other side,
the STL, a tribunal formed without the support of a national parliament (in
addition to opposition from other powerful actors in the region such as
Syria and Hezbollah),116 might serve as an example of how to establish an
operation tribunal in tense political circumstances.
108. Tom Parker, Prosecuting Saddam: The Coalition Provisional Authority and the
Evolution of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 899, 907– 09 (2005).
109. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 114– 16.
110. Id. at 114– 17; Original Iraqi High Tribunal Statute art. 17(b).
111. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 119– 20.
112. Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 8, at 5.
113. Kelly, supra note 8, at 23.
114. Id.
115. See WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 113– 20.
116. Beham, supra note 14, at 363.
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IV. The Potential for an ICC Trial in the Muslim World
A. Jurisdiction of the ICC
Given the obstacles that would inhibit the formation of either a
Mazaˆlim court or a hybrid international/Islamic criminal court, it becomes
necessary to analyze another possible legal mechanism that could allow for
prosecutions of those responsible for the war crimes and crimes against
humanity taking place in the Muslim world today.  One such possibility is
the ICC.  The first step is determining whether the ICC would even have
jurisdiction to prosecute such a case.  There are a number of ways by which
the ICC can obtain personal jurisdiction over an individual.  If the individ-
ual is a national of a state that is party to the Rome Statute, then the ICC
has personal jurisdiction over that individual.117  In addition, if the ICC
wishes to prosecute a person in a state that is not a party to the Rome
Statute, and that person is not a national of a state party to the Statute, the
United Nations Security Council can formally request an ICC indict-
ment.118  This is what happened in the case of Sudan’s president, Omar al-
Bashir, whom the ICC indicted via U.N. recommendation for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, even though Sudan is not a party
to the Rome Statute.119
Furthermore, the Rome Statute leaves open the possibility for applying
principles of Islamic criminal law in war crimes trials.120  Indeed, the cre-
ators of the Court intended that it be able to exercise jurisdiction where
domestic trials would not take place or would not adhere to certain core
conditions of international law.121  Thus, it is perfectly possible, should an
ICC trial ever arise in the Middle East, that Islamic law could compose part
of the governing law of the tribunal.  Many of the acts that have been com-
mitted by various groups, including ISIL and Syria’s Assad regime, would
be considered crimes under both Islamic and international law.122  Exam-
ples of such acts are the killing of non-combatants, the killing of hostages,
the killing of refugees, the killing of minors, rape, torture, the destruction
of civilian establishments, and wanton destruction of property.123  Thus,
with respect to such crimes there would be no conflict between Islamic and
international law in prosecuting people for the commission of such acts.
117. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12(2)(b), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
118. MALEKIAN, supra note 28, at 354 n.20.
119. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation
%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/Pages/icc02050109.aspx; MALEKIAN,
supra note 28, at 354.
120. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 21(1)(c), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must
be consistent with internationally recognized human right . . . .”); Beham, supra note 14,
at 359.
121. Cernusca, supra note 57, at 367.
122. See MALEKIAN, supra note 28, at 203– 07; Civil War in Syria, supra note 1; Laub, R
supra note 1. R
123. MALEKIAN, supra note 28, at 203– 05.
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However, while the crimes that the ICC has the power to prosecute
have certainly occurred in the Middle East today, the issue of establishing
jurisdiction is more problematic.  Neither Syria nor Iraq, where essentially
all of the criminal acts committed by ISIL and the Assad regime have been
committed, are parties to the Rome Statute.124  Therefore, the ICC does not
have clear jurisdiction over individuals who are nationals of only those
countries.  However, this is not the end of the matter: the ICC may still
prosecute those members of either faction who are citizens of other coun-
tries that are parties to the Rome Statute.  ISIL in particular has numerous
members who are nationals of countries such as France, Great Britain, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia, Tunisia, and Jordan,125 all of
which are parties to the Rome Statute.126  With respect to members of the
Assad regime, there is virtually no likelihood of a United Nations Security
Council request for their indictment.  Russia’s ties to the Assad regime127
and its permanent membership on the Security Council with the ability to
veto a call for an ICC indictment128 would seem to make such an indict-
ment of members of the Assad regime all but an impossibility.
B. Other Challenges to a Potential ICC Trial
Beyond jurisdictional issues, there are other concerns with having the
ICC organize a war crimes trial in the Muslim world.  Several large Muslim-
majority states, such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Iran, have not ratified the
Rome Statute.129  This is particularly important in the case of Iran, whose
deep involvement with the Assad regime130 could lead to Iran being a key
player once hostilities stabilize in the region and actors potentially attempt
to establish a war crimes tribunal.
Furthermore, there are also due process concerns.  While a number of
voices have called for a modernization of Islamic law that would make it
more compatible with international law, there have also been arguments
against this movement.131  Particular areas in Islamic law where the full
application of due process appears to be lacking are in the rights to an
independent and impartial trial, the right to appeal, and gender equality in
124. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. COURT, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en
_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome
%20statute.aspx.
125. Reuters, Little Chance of Investigating ISIS War Crimes, Prosecutor Says, NEWS-
WEEK (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/little-chance-investigating-isis-war-
crimes-prosecutor-says-320621.
126. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, supra note 124.
127. See generally Anna Borshchevskaya, Russia’s Many Interests in Syria, WASH. INST.
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-many-
interests-in-syria.
128. Newsteam Staff, The UN Security Council (UNSC), COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/un-secur
ity-council-unsc/p31649.
129. Cernusca, supra note 57, at 369.
130. Esther Pan, Syria, Iran, and the Mideast Conflict, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July
18, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/iran/syria-iran-mideast-conflict/p11122.
131. See Cernusca, supra note 57, at 368– 71.
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assessing evidence.132  These issues are relevant because it is unclear
whether regimes governed by legal systems that would deprive parties of
due process would have full admissibility to the ICC.133  Thus, for the ICC
to eventually be able to successfully create a war crimes trial based in
Islamic law to deal with the Assad regime and/or ISIL, the Court would
need to be able to gain jurisdiction over nationals of states that are party to
the Rome Statute, potentially deal with regional players not party to the
Rome Statute, and preferably adopt a form of Islamic law that is least likely
to create due process concerns.
V. Beyond the Obstacles: What a War Crimes Tribunal Governed by
Islamic Law Might Look Like
A. Could an Islamic War Crimes Tribunal Uphold Human Rights?
While the challenges to a war crimes tribunal taking place against
those actors currently at work in Iraq and Syria should not be understated,
the preceding pages have hopefully illuminated some of the reasons why
such a tribunal is still possible.  The question then arises as to what such a
tribunal, particularly one operating primarily with Shari’a as its choice of
law, would look like.  Given the paramount importance of defending uni-
versal human rights as an objective of a war crimes tribunals, the first ques-
tion to address is whether such a body would adequately uphold universal
human rights standards.  The goal of this section of the note will be to gain
a firmer grasp of what such a body would look like should it actually come
to fruition, and whether it would meet baseline international human rights
standards.134
132. Id. at 372– 76.
133. Id. at 377– 78.
134. It should be noted that respect and recognition of such basic universal interna-
tional standards is actually a relatively recent phenomenon.  An example of interna-
tional investment law actually illustrates this point well.  During the colonial era, it was
assumed that local law would not apply to foreign investors, who instead would then
carry the law of their home state with them as they traveled and invested abroad. SURYA
P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 7 (2d ed. 2012).  The need for international
law here was minimal because investments by colonial powers into their colonies “did
not need protection as the colonial legal systems were integrated with those of the impe-
rial powers and the imperial system gave sufficient protection for the investments which
went into the colonies.” M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
19 (3d ed. 2010).  However, once colonialism came to an end, so too did the idea that
local law could not apply to foreign nationals, given the rise of the doctrines of sover-
eignty and sovereign equality. SUBEDI, supra 134, at 8.  Commenters on international
law began to invoke the writings like those of American statesman Elihu Root, who dealt
with the issue of an international minimum standard of justice and equity in saying that
“if any country’s system of law does not conform to that standard . . . then no other
country could be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treat-
ment to its citizens.”  Elihu Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 AM.
J. INT’L L. 517, 522 (1910).  S.K.B. Asante expanded on this idea, proffering the position
that “[w]here international standards fall below the international minimum standard,
the latter prevails.”  Samuel K.B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A
Reappraisal, 37 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 588, 590 (1988).  As for what constitutes the mini-
mum international standard, the General Claims Commission articulated that the test
for determining whether individuals were accorded proper treatment according to this
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One metric used to gauge a country’s respect for upholding human
rights is to see whether that country is a signatory to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  The ICCPR is a treaty that
guarantees twenty-four substantive civil and political rights, ranging from
the right of self-determination, freedom from torture, and political
rights.135  The treaty signifies “the positive international law guarantee of
civil and political rights under the international human rights objective of
the UN.”136  The vast majority of states across the globe are parties to the
ICCPR.137  Among Muslim-majority states, the only countries that are
either non-signatories or non-parties to the agreement are Brunei, Malaysia,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.138  At least one
thorough study analyzing the substantive guarantees of the ICCPR in light
of Islamic law has demonstrated that the treaty is not incompatible with
Islamic law.139  Professor Baderin’s analysis concludes that “the Sharˆı’ah
does not oppose or prohibit the guarantee of civil and political rights, lib-
eral and democratic principles or the liberty of individuals in relation to
the state.”140  Baderin does identify gender equality, the usage of cruel and
unusual punishments, and freedom of religion to be the areas most diffi-
cult to reconcile between international and Islamic law, but finds ulti-
mately that these issues are “not insurmountable where addressed open-
mindedly and in a well-informed manner.”141  While Baderin’s claims are
not without critics, numerous scholars support the proposition that
Islamic law is not inherently incompatible with international human
rights.142  Thus, there exists robust intellectual support for the notion that
international standard was to ask whether they had been “treated in accordance with
ordinary standards of civilization.”  Great Britain v. Spain (1924), 2 R.I.A.A. 615.  Thus,
in understanding what is meant by a minimum international standard, we can better
determine if other tribunals are capable meeting the mark.
135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 1, 7, 25, Dec. 16, 1966,
31 I.L.M. 645, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
136. BADERIN, supra note 22, at 48.
137. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 135.
138. Id.
139. One such analysis is a study by Professor Mashood Baderin.  The examination
itself is too extensive to cover properly here, but among the areas touched by Islamic law
that Baderin investigates for their compatibility with the ICCPR within an Islamic legal
context are freedom from retroactive criminal law, the right to privacy, the question of
apostasy under Islamic law, the prohibition of propaganda for war and incitement of
hatred, the right of peaceful assembly, and the right to freedom of association, among
many others. See BADERIN, supra note 22, at 167– 68.
140. Id. at 167.
141. Id.
142. Farhad Malekian’s extensive analysis states:
It is a well-known fact that the spirit of both [international criminal law and
Islamic international criminal law] is to release all human beings from all con-
cepts of limitations, restrictions and superficial differences and ignorance.
Simultaneously, the system of international criminal law does not ignore Islamic
law and puts a heavy weight, on its concepts, in terms of the coexistence of
sovereignties.
MALEKIAN, supra note 28, at XXIV.  Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl states that “Islam in the
modern age has become associated with violence, harshness, and cruelty. . . although
mercy and compassion are core values in Islamic theology,” and that Islamic law as an
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an Islamic tribunal could be organized in such a way as to conform to
international human rights standards.
While it thus appears that a war crimes tribunal governed under
Islamic law could, despite some areas of tension, be governed in such a way
so as to be compatible with international law, what is just as clear is that
such a tribunal could actually contravene international law.  Certain
schools of Islamic legal thought, such as Wahhabism, permit the reforma-
tion of Islam through violence.143  Clearly, one would not be able to find
justifications for such actions in international law.  Thus, any tribunal gov-
erned under a legal system that operates under an Islamic legal system sim-
ilar to Wahhabism and accepts violence as a valid means of religious
reformation could allow defendants accused of such acts to go free from
prosecution rather than force them to face the punishment that they could
otherwise be subjected to under international law.  Other regimes, such as
the Shia government of Iran, have their own legal justifications for what
would otherwise be considered violations of international law.  Iran has
justified its own international law violations through comparison with
other purported violations of human rights law committed by Western
nations within the territories of other countries.144  Iran points to these
acts and declares that if Western powers are allowed to commit crimes of
international law without punishment, then smaller powers like Iran
should be given a similar break for violations that they might commit, espe-
cially when they are kept contained within their own national borders.145
Any possible violations of international law committed by the West aside,
such declarations do little to assure that a war crimes tribunal overseen by
Iranian clerics or similarly-minded Islamic legal scholars would be effective
in applying international law.
intellectual tradition is capable of developing both “morally and vigorously confront[ing]
renewed moral challenges,” and thus better maintaining international legal standards, if
it engages in “a rich and critical intellectual discourse.”  Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Cul-
ture of Ugliness in Modern Islam and Reengaging Morality, 2 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L.
33, 40 (2002– 03).  Professor Ann Elizabeth Mayer would also seem to agree, pointing to
the political forces at work that have made some Islamic legal systems more difficult to
reconcile with international law.  Thus, point here then is that any incompatibilities are
not endemic to Islamic law per se, but only to certain specific regimes seeking to con-
strue it in such a way.  Specifically, Mayer points out:
[T]he constructs of Islamic rights in the civil and political sphere, that one finds
in schemes like the Cairo Declaration and the Saudi Basic Law, are designed to
shore up the political interests of those promoting them and have only a tenuous
connection to Islamic culture.  They borrow extensively from Western rights
models and mine the Islamic heritage only very selectively - shutting out the
enlightened, modern perspectives of Muslims who are supportive of human
rights.
Mayer, supra 60, at 401– 02.
143. Islamic Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation, ISLAMIC
SUPREME COUNCIL OF AM., http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/
anti-extremism/7-islamic-radicalism-its-wahhabi-roots-and-current-representation.html
(last visited June 24, 2016).
144. MALEKIAN, supra note 28, at 22.
145. Id.
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Thus, while there does not seem to be a lack of a discourse on human
rights within the Islamic legal community, there are a multitude of
approaches to the topic, as well as differences of opinion as to what specific
legal rules should apply in an Islamic court.  Baderin’s work focused on
“the possibility of constructive harmonization of international human
rights norms with Islamic law.”146  It is encouraging to anyone who cares
about human rights and international law that such a synergistic relation-
ship between these systems is possible.  However, the fact that such coordi-
nation is possible says nothing about its likelihood of realization.  In order
to have a better idea of the likelihood that an Islamic war crimes tribunal
would uphold high human rights standards, there are of a variety of factors
that must first be examined.
B. Shaping the Tribunal: The Interplay of Regional and International
Powers
As has already been mentioned, nation-states are chiefly responsible
for the formation of war crimes tribunals.147  In the case of Syria and Iraq,
there are many states with deep interests in both the conflict and in the
region generally that would want a voice in creating a possible war crimes
tribunal.148  These states come from a variety of legal and political back-
grounds, ranging from the Wahhabi absolutist monarchy of Saudi Arabia,
the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran, the constitutional monarchy of Jordan,
and the secular Republic of Turkey, just to name a few.149  These do not
even account for the roles to be played by other non-Muslim majority
nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia
among others.150  Given the pluralism present here, it would appear that
whatever legal system would come to govern such a tribunal, it would cer-
tainly not be anything that resembles the more radical systems such as that
of Saudi Arabia or Iran.  Whether the body were to be formed as a hybrid
tribunal or under the ICC, neither format would allow for such radical law
to govern the tribunal given that such legal regimes are so profoundly anti-
thetical to international laws and norms.  Furthermore, any call for a
146. BADERIN, supra note 22, at 219.
147. Hale, supra note 6, at 431– 32. R
148. See Syria crisis: Where key countries stand, BBC (Oct. 30, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587.
149. Kelly, supra note 8, at 14. See generally Robert Lee & Lihi Ben Shitrit, Religion,
Society, and Politics in the Middle East, in 13 THE MIDDLE EAST 209, 209 (Ellen Lust ed.,
2013).
150. See generally BARAH MIKAIL, FRANCE’S SHIFTING MIDDLE EASTERN ALLIANCES (Nov.
2014), http://fride.org/download/pb_188_france_shifting_middle_eastern_alliances
.pdf; Bassam Barabandi, Aaron Hesse & P.J. Dermer, Russia’s New Middle East Great
Game, MIDDLE E. INST. (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.mei.edu/content/article/russia
%E2%80%99s-new-middle-east-great-game; Aaron David Miller, The Politically Incorrect
Guide to U.S. Interests in the Middle East, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 15, 2012), http://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/15/the-politically-incorrect-guide-to-u-s-interests-in-the-mid
dle-east/; David Wearing, Understanding British Foreign Policy in the Middle East, NEW
LEFT PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_
comments/understanding_british_foreign_policy_in_the_middle_east.
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totally internationalized tribunal would likely face rebuke for the same rea-
sons that such a model was rejected at the STL, namely the concern over
removing local responsibility for seeing justice done.151  Thus, the only
viable way forward in this regard would be a compromise similar to what
took place both in the STL and the IHT: domestic laws of the region com-
bined with some supervisory aspects of internationalism so as to ensure
that the tribunal accords with international law.
However, another possible complication is that the current domestic
law of the Syrian government could not govern this tribunal.  If this were to
occur, it would be an implicit recognition of the Assad regime, something
that the United States and other powers would vigorously oppose.152
There then seem to be a few potential options that follow from this point.
One, either Iraqi law could serve as the basis of the tribunal’s law, or two,
as was the case with the IHT, a provisional government could be estab-
lished (likely in Syria, assuming that the Assad regime and ISIL are toppled
and the Iraqi government seeks to reestablish control of lands previously
held by ISIL) similar to the CPA in post-invasion Iraq with the task of for-
mulating the details of how the tribunal would operate.  Like in the case of
the CPA, this could be done under international guidance to ensure that
international standards of justice are met in the trial’s operation and prose-
cution of defendants.  All of this assumes a hybrid tribunal rather than an
ICC trial.  Again, while the ICC would allow for some flexibility in the
choice of law, it would certainly not choose any system like that of Iran or
Saudi Arabia, and would be forced to choose from more moderate legal
systems such as that of Iraq.
C. The Future of Islamic Law and the Importance of Building an
Internationalist Framework
It thus appears clear that because international involvement in the
establishment of an Islamic war crimes tribunal, while able to accommo-
date different bodies of Islamic law, would aim to construct a legal body
that upholds international law, any actors interested in both international
law and such a tribunal’s organization should argue for international
action in the tribunal’s formation.  Any tribunal created by small numbers
of strictly regional actors with no broad international involvement could
result in a tribunal based in a version of Islamic law, like those of Saudi
Arabia or Iran, that is not in accord with international laws and norms, the
exercise of which could thus lead to outcomes that violate human rights
law.
An Islamic war crimes tribunal that violated International law would
not only harm the international legal system itself (along with any individ-
uals who might suffer punishments that they otherwise might not have had
151. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 75.
152. This, given the fact that President Obama has maintained his position that Assad
must be removed from office as president of Syria.  Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama Says
Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad Must Go, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/obama-says-syrian-leader-bashar-al-assad-must-go-1447925671.
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international law been adhered to properly), but would be a detriment to
Islamic law itself as a system capable of viably addressing crimes of inter-
national law and human rights.  It would not be the first time that such a
thing has happened.  Professor Khaled Abou El Fadl notes that a plethora
of “morally offensive” acts have taken place in recent decades in the name
of Islam, such as “the stoning and imprisonment of rape victims in Paki-
stan and Nigeria, the degradation of women by the Taliban, the destruction
of the Buddha statues in Afghanistan, the sexual violation of domestic
workers in Saudi Arabia, the excommunication of writers in Egypt, and the
killing of civilians in terrorist attacks.”153  El Fadl’s highlights the fact that
some Muslims have often been forced to defend their religion from criti-
cism, while Muslim apologists simultaneously provide what he deems are
unpersuasive responses.154  El Fadl’s own response is that “the contempo-
rary Islamic world has been intellectually impoverished, and so for
instance, there has been virtually no influential philosophical or critical
intellectual movements emerging from the Muslim world in the modern
age.”155  He then goes on to say that Muslim societies are undergoing a
transformation in which they have the possibility to “reclaim [their]
humanistic moral tradition.”156
Therefore, the establishment of an Islamic war crimes tribunal operat-
ing outside the bounds of international law would certainly not be helpful
in establishing Islamic law as a part of the international order capable of
efficaciously dealing with humanitarian calamities.  Indeed, the likely
result would be quite the opposite, with more critics declaring Islamic law
unfit to dispense justice.  This is a counterproductive conclusion, both
because it has already been shown that at least certain bodies of Islamic
law can work within the bounds of international law, and also because the
Muslim world is not likely to face a shortage of predicaments regarding
human rights and international law in the near future.157  Thus, if the peo-
ple of Islamic societies are to have any autonomy in the establishment of
Islamic war crimes tribunals, it is to everyone’s benefit that they are organ-
ized in such a way as to conform to international law.  Only in such a way
can widely accepted global norms be upheld, and Islamic law might be
confirmed as a sustainable method of dealing with transnational issues.
Concluding Remarks
The issues regarding the interaction of Islamic and international law
are far from settled.  Factors and trends exist that both facilitate and hinder
such interplay, and it is not clear which of these developments will have the
more lasting impact in the long-term.  The sheer political and legal disunity
153. El Fadl, supra note 142, at 34– 35.
154. Id. at 35– 36.
155. Id. at 40.
156. Id. at 41.
157. See generally Jack A. Smith, Will the Middle East Crisis Worsen in the New Year?,
FOREIGN POL’Y J. (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/01/12/
will-the-middle-east-crisis-worsen-in-the-new-year/.
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in the Middle East precludes a truly comprehensive Islamic court such as
the Wilaˆyah al-Mazaˆlim.  However, given the possibility of political changes
easing the current strains between Islamic and international law, the
proliferation of international law worldwide, and the necessity for Muslim
societies to confront human rights concerns in an effective way, it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that a world might eventually exist where Islamic and
international legal systems fall more into harmony.  Furthermore, the les-
sons from the cases of both the STL and the IHT provide useful informa-
tion for the possibility of establishing a hybrid tribunal.  While challenges
to a hybrid model are not inconsequential, the complications regarding an
ICC trial seem no less imposing.  Thus, while neither of these forums is
precluded from conducting a war crimes trial, in either case the difficulties
must be honestly acknowledged and confronted.  Only then can there be a
hope of trying and prosecuting those currently engaged in the heinous acts
of violence that are ravaging Iraq and Syria today.
Even so, if such a tribunal ever does materialize, it is not guaranteed
that it would unquestionably maintain the standards of international law.
Thus, it would behoove those involved in its establishment to choose
Shari’a as the body’s governing law and to advocate for an Islamic legal
system that does in fact uphold the standards of international law.  It is
vital to keep the importance of this course in mind, for to do otherwise
could allow for violations of international laws and norms and thus work
to undermine the ability of Islamic law to respond effectively to interna-
tional crimes and crises that will certainly continue plaguing Arab and
Muslim societies.
The people of Iraq and Syria have been the unfortunate victims of
innumerable atrocities committed at the hands of the Assad regime on one
side of the conflict and ISIL on the other.  Whatever the resolution to this
conflict might be, and whenever it might come, it can only be the hope of
internationalist observers that those responsible for the war crimes and
crimes against humanity in this part of the world one day face the full force
of justice from a competent judicial authority.  If a war crimes tribunal is
selected as the method for doing this, the people affected by these brutali-
ties might justifiably demand autonomy in the governance of such a tribu-
nal, a part of this perhaps coming in the form of a call for Islamic law to
dispense justice to the responsible parties.  Should that day come, those
responsible for organizing such a tribunal should be well aware of the chal-
lenges to such a body’s implementation, the optimal way to construct the
tribunal so as to best ensure a successful outcome, and the resulting impli-
cations for both international law and Islamic law.
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